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Abstract. Quantum key distribution (QKD) has the potential for widespread real-world
applications. To date no secure long-distance experiment has demonstrated the truly practical
operation needed to move QKD from the laboratory to the real world due largely to limitations
in synchronization and poor detector performance. Here we report results obtained using a
fully automated, robust QKD system based on the Bennett Brassard 1984 protocol (BB84)[1]
with low-noise superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) and decoy levels.
Secret key is produced with unconditional security over a record 144.3 km of optical fibre, an
increase of more than a factor of five compared to the previous record for unconditionally
secure key generation in a practical QKD system.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 85.25.Pb
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) holds the promise of communication with security resting
firmly on the foundation of quantum mechanics rather than unproven assumptions regarding
current and future computational resources. In the BB84 protocol [1], the most common
prepare and measure protocol, the sender (Alice) ideally encodes a single photon with a
bit value of either 0 or 1 in one of two conjugate bases and sends it to the receiver (Bob).
When Bob receives a photon, he measures it in one of the two bases. Alice and Bob then
publicly share their basis choices and only keep the bits where the bases match. Because the
information is encoded in a single photon, any tampering by an eavesdropper (Eve) results
in an increased error rate detectable by the legitimate users of the system. After performing
error correction [2] to remove any errors that may have arisen from the operations of an
eavesdropper or from imperfections in the experimental apparatus, Alice and Bob perform a
privacy amplification step [3] to erase any partial information Eve might have obtained about
the transmission. The final result is a string of 0s and 1s that Alice and Bob share but about
which Eve has negligibly small information.
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Although it is straightforward to see how QKD with ideal sources and detectors is secure,
real-world QKD systems must contend with imperfect experimental components. In 2000,
it was pointed out that the use of attenuated lasers (which emit photons in a Poissonian
distribution) drastically limits the secure range of laser-based QKD systems [4]. Eve could
perform a photon number splitting (PNS) attack in which she selectively changes the channel
transmittance based on photon number but still maintains the expected rate of detections at
Bob. If the rate of multi-photon pulses at Alice is larger than the rate of photon detections
at Bob, then Eve could block all the laser pulses containing single photons, and only allow
transmission of the multi-photon pulses, which are inherently insecure. In this case, the entire
string of “secure” bits could, in fact, be known to Eve.
Several methods have been proposed to mitigate the effects of PNS attacks. The most
straightforward is to simply use a very low mean photon number µ, on order of the channel
transmittance, to guarantee that at least some of the detections at Bob originated from single
photons at Alice [4]. Unfortunately, this results in very low secret bit rates as well as greatly
limiting the possible transmission length due to dark counts in the detectors. The SARG
protocol [5], which allows for secure bits to be formed from both one- and two-photon signals,
outperforms standard BB84 , but it offers no performance advantage compared to BB84 with
“decoy states” as described below [6]. Differential phase shift QKD (DPS-QKD) is another
method of protecting against PNS attacks [7], but there does not currently exist a security
proof against all attacks for the DPS-QKD protocol, so it does not provide the unconditional
security needed for QKD.
The use of decoy states [8, 9, 10, 11] with the BB84 protocol has provided a method for
achieving high bit rates while protecting against PNS attacks and maintaining the underlying
security of BB84. In a decoy state protocol, Alice transmits signals randomly picked from
several different mean photon levels µj rather than just one. If Eve, who is ignorant of the
µj value for each specific signal, were to attempt to perform a PNS attack, she would not
be able to simultaneously modify the channel transmission for all the µj values to reproduce
the expected statistics at Bob. By comparing the number of photon detections at each mean
photon level, Alice and Bob can determine a rigorous bound on the number of single photons
that have been received by Bob and incorporate this bound into the privacy amplification step.
Decoy state protocols have been demonstrated over a free-space link [12] and in several
different fibre systems [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. However, many of the demonstrations,
although they are important proof-of-principle experiments, do not perform the full QKD
protocol, including error correction and privacy amplification, but instead only estimate the
secret bit rate and range of the system. Furthermore, most systems have employed either
local synchronization (transmitter and receiver share the same clock) or synchronization
over a separate fibre, methods that pose a significant barrier for deployment. Although a
practical uni-directional system with remote synchronization has been demonstrated over
short distances of 25 km with high bit rates [17, 18], the detectors used in these experiments
were not sufficiently quiet to enable long-distance fibre QKD. Here we describe the first
practical QKD system capable of secure operation over distances greater than 100 km.
The system uses a three-level decoy-state protocol in a fibre phase-encoding quantum key
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distribution system with independent clocks at the transmitter and receiver and low-noise
superconducting nanowire single photon detectors (SNSPDs). In addition to being secure
against PNS attacks, our data is secure against a number of other attacks, including Trojan
Horse attacks that affect bi-directional systems, timing attacks based on exploiting detector
efficiency mismatch [21], and attacks based on differing timing responses between detectors
[22].
2. Finite statistics decoy state protocol
The security of our protocol rests on knowing the number of sifted bits arising from single
photons produced by Alice, and the disturbance, or bit error rate, on those bits. Our security
statement incorporates finite statistics into each step of the protocol. The number of secret
bits distilled from each basis is calculated as a modification from [23]
Nsecret = Nsifted
[
y−1 µe
−µ
(
1− fPAH2(b
+
1 )
)
− fECH2(B)−
(
1−
1
fDS
H2(z)
)]
(1)
where Nsifted is the number of sifted bits in the selected basis, B is the observed bit error rate
in this basis, y−1 is a lower bound on the transmittance of single photons, b+1 is an upper bound
on the single-photon bit error rate in the conjugate basis, z is the fraction of zeroes among
the sifted bits in this basis, and H2(·) is the Shannon binary entropy function, and fPA, fEC,
and fDS are privacy amplification, error correction, and deskewing efficiency factors needed
to accommodate the finite statistics of the data.
The decoy state protocol allows us to determine a lower bound on the single photon
transmittance y−1 and an upper bound on the single photon error rate b+1 . The value of y−1 is
the minimal value of y1 satisfying the following inequalities:
Y −j ≤ e
−µj
∞∑
n=0
(µj)
n
n!
yn ≤ Y
+
j
where yn is the transmittance of an n-photon signal and Y +j (Y −j ) is the upper (lower) bound
on the yield of detection events when mean photon number µj is used for transmission.
In contrast to other work where Y ±j are calculated assuming that the underlying detection
statistics are Gaussian, we make no such assumption and use the full binomial distribution to
calculate the bounds within some user-defined confidence level, chosen to be 1×10−7 for this
experiment.
We use two methods to determine the single photon error rate b1. The first, referred
to as the “worst-case” scenario, makes the conservative assumption that all observed errors
occur on single photons. In this case, b+1 is simply equal to the number of observed errors
divided by the number of sifted bits that arose from single photons prepared by Alice, which
can be computed from the lower bound y−1 . However, we can obtain a tighter bound on b1 by
utilizing the information contained in the differing error rates at each µj and constructing a
set of inequalities involving the bounds on the observed bit error rates Bj and the n-photon
bit error rates bn:
B−j ≤ e
−µj
∞∑
n=0
(µj)
n
n!
ynbn ≤ B
+
j
Practical long-distance quantum key distribution system using decoy levels 4
Analogous to the method for finding y−1 , b+1 is found by determining the maximal value of
b1 that satisfies these inequalities. Computing this tighter bound on b1 can be carried out by
linear programming, as for y−1 , but here it is subject to quadratic constraints, so the analysis is
computationally more intensive, although still tractable. In either case, the bounds on y1 and
b1 are valid even if the quantum channel is time-varying.
Equation 1 involves three efficiency factors (fEC , fPA and fDS) which quantify finite
statistics effects during the stages of QKD. Asymptotically, all three factors approach unity,
but for a finite session length they are strictly greater than one. Reconciliation via practical
error-correcting algorithms does not achieve the Shannon capacity of the binary symmetric
channel, and the extra overhead in parity checks that needs to be communicated between
Alice and Bob is expressed by the factor fEC . Privacy amplification involves removing any
partial information Eve may have gained by disturbing those single-photon signals present
among the sifted bits. Following Koashi [24], we numerically compute the logarithm (base
two) of the number of typical strings that are needed to describe with high confidence the
output of a binary symmetric channel with a given bit flip probability, using the bit error rate
in one basis to determine the amount of privacy amplification required in the other basis. The
factor fPA denotes how much the size of this output differs from the Shannon entropy of
the single-photon signals. The last finite statistics effect we consider is due to the imbalance
between the two detector efficiencies, which leads to a bias between the zeroes and ones for
the sifted bits in each basis. This bias can reduce Eve’s search space of guessing over likely
reconciled keys prior to privacy amplification. Asymptotically, Shannon entropy again gives
the required reduction in secret information, but any practical algorithm for removing the bias,
or deskewing, is likely to have inefficiencies, which is encompassed by the factor fDS . We
followed Peres [25] in iterating von Neumann’s algorithm for generating unbiased bits out of
the reconciled keys to determine the value of fDS .
3. Automated QKD system
A diagram of the automated, reconfigurable QKD system used [26] is shown in Figure 1. A
1550 nm distributed feedback laser is pulsed at a clock rate of 10 MHz, and the resulting
photons are sent to Alice’s phase encoder. The photon wavepacket is split into a “short” and a
“long” path, and the portion of the wavepacket that traversed the long path is modulated by the
electro-optic phase modulator, located outside the interferometer for stability. Likewise, the
wavepacket is again split in Bob’s decoder, and only the part of the wavepacket that traveled
through Alice’s long path is modulated. Interference ultimately occurs between the Alice-
long-Bob-short and Alice-short-Bob-long amplitudes. Polarization maintaining fibre is used
within the interferometers to ensure that these two paths are indistinguishable.
The quantum channel consists of 151.5 km of optical fibre with an attenuation of
.206 dB per km, and shorter distances are obtained by redefining Alice’s enclave to include
a portion of the fibre. The bit and basis selections at Alice and Bob are all determined by
the output of physical random number generators, and a high-speed optical switch, driven
by a pseudo-random pattern, provides the three intensity levels needed for our decoy state
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Figure 1. Optical train of the phase-encoding quantum key distribution system used in this
work. The variable optical attenuator (VOA) provides attenuation to the single photon level,
from which the amplitude modulator provides the different µj levels needed for the decoy
level protocol. Red lines indicate polarization maintaining fibre, and blue lines represent single
mode fibre. Photons are detected by two superconducting nanowire single photon detectors
(SNSPDs) biased to achieve matching detection efficiencies.
protocol. (In a deployed system, the pseudo-random pattern generator would simply be
replaced by a physical random number generator.) The superconducting nanowire single
photon detectors (SNSPDs) [27] used for these measurements are cooled to 3 Kelvin in a
closed-cycle refrigeration system and coupled to single-mode telecom fibre. They operate
in ungated mode with a measured full width at half maximum timing jitter of 69 ps and a
recovery time of < 10 ns. The detectors were individually current biased to a matching
detection efficiency of 0.5%, resulting in a summed average dark count rate over the entire
acquisition period of 78.1 counts/second.
The system is fully automated and able to run for many hours without user intervention.
Independent Rubidium oscillators are employed as frequency references at Alice and Bob and
are synchronized using only the quantum signals. For each acquisition period (typically 1–
10 seconds), a photon arrival time histogram is created that is used to determine the current
average frequency offset between the two oscillators, which is corrected by adjusting one of
the clocks’ frequencies. Long-term system stability is achieved through a combination of
tuning and QKD runs. Tuning runs are insecure sessions executed at a high photon number
to quickly obtain the statistics needed for interferometer and timing adjustments, while QKD
runs adhere to the requirements for secure key generation. To minimize the effects of system
de-tuning, tuning runs are promptly followed by QKD runs. The use of ungated detectors and
post-selection of detection timestamps in software relaxes the system timing requirements to
the phase modulator voltage pulse width, 2–3 ns, rather than being constrained to the sub-
nanosecond electrical detector gate width required for avalanche photodiodes. Periodically,
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the polarization controller is automatically adjusted to compensate for any polarization drifts
within the fibre by maximizing transmission through the linear polarizer.
4. Results and conclusions
We chose µj values with associated sending probabilities that were near-optimal for a fibre
length of 135 km. The selected mean photon numbers were [µ0 = 0.0025, µ1 = 0.13, µ2 = 0.57]
(µ0, ideally the vacuum state, was constrained to be 23.5 dB below the high µ2 level by the ex-
tinction ratio of the switch) with associated sending probabilities [0.1, 0.2, 0.7]. In 5.6 hours
of acquisition time and using a timing window of 184 ps, the number of detection events
recorded at µ2, µ1, and µ0 was 80776, 5729, and 341, respectively, and a total of 40538 sifted
bits with a bias (fraction of zeros in one basis) of 0.494 were created. The sifted bits and
the basis choices both passed the FIPS 140-2 cryptographic randomness tests [28]. After data
were collected, the bits were sifted, error corrected using the modified CASCADE algorithm
[29], and privacy amplified as described in equation (1) after determining the bounds on the
single photon transmittance and error rate. The efficiency factors due to the finite data size
were determined to be fEC ≈ 1.07, fPA ≈ 1.09 and fDS ≈ 1.05.
As shown in Figure 2, b+1 , the bound on the single photon error rate, is significantly
higher when the worst-case assumption that all the errors occur on single photons is made.
The tighter b1 bound not only yields more secret bits at any given distance, but it also extends
the distance over which secret bits can be exchanged. Use of the “worst-case” b1 results in
3990 secret bits at 135 km and a maximum range of 141.6 km. When the tighter bound on
b1 is used, 6127 secret bits are produced at 135 km and the range of the system is extended
to 144.3 km, a new record for key distribution secure against general attacks [23], including
photon-number-splitting attacks.
By choosing different mean photon numbers and sending probabilities and acquiring
data for longer times, it would be possible to extend the range even further in this system.
Figure 3 shows the results of simulations based on the system properties to determine the
maximum range of the system. With the same detectors used in this work, this system could
achieve a range of 166.1 km. Although the detection efficiency of these detectors is currently
quite low, by embedding the detectors in a stack of optical elements designed to increase
absorption at the target wavelength [30] and improving the optical coupling to the detector,
it should be possible to increase the system detection efficiency considerably. An increase to
50% (assuming the same dark count and background photon rates) would result in bit rates
higher by approximately two orders of magnitude at any given distance in the asymptotic
limit, and an increase in the tolerable link loss to over 50 dB. From our results, which are
the first demonstration of assured security over long distances in a deployable system, we can
infer that reasonable improvements in component technology will result in several hundred
bits per second over distances of 100 km, more than an order of magnitude higher than what
is presently available.
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Figure 2. (a) Bound on single photon transmittance y−1 ; (b) bounds on the single photon error
rate b+1 assuming either the “worst-case” (dashed green line) or by finding a tighter bound
(solid blue line); and (c) secret bit rate as a function of distance. Data was acquired over a
151.5 km link, and the decoy levels and sending probabilities were chosen to maximize the
secret bit rate at 135 km.
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Figure 3. Simulated performance of system used in this work for different acquisition times
and distances. The optimal mean photon number and sending probabilities are found for
each distance and acquisition time. The data point at 135 km matches the prediction of the
simulation. Even with an efficiency of 0.5%, the SNSPDs enable the creation of secret bits out
to 166.1 km.
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